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Abstract—Credit card fraud is a growing problem that
affects card holders around the world. Fraud detection has
been an interesting topic in machine learning. Nevertheless,
current state of the art credit card fraud detection algorithms
miss to include the real costs of credit card fraud as a measure
to evaluate algorithms. In this paper a new comparison
measure that realistically represents the monetary gains and
losses due to fraud detection is proposed. Moreover, using the
proposed cost measure a cost sensitive method based on Bayes
minimum risk is presented. This method is compared with
state of the art algorithms and shows improvements up to
23% measured by cost. The results of this paper are based on
real life transactional data provided by a large European card
processing company.
Keywords-Credit card fraud detection; Bayesian decision
theory; Cost sensitive classiﬁcation
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of credit and debit cards has increased signif-
icantly in the last years, unfortunately so has the fraud
committed with them. According to the European Central
Bank [1], during 2010 the total level of fraud reached
1.26 billion in the Single Euro Payments Area. Currently,
ﬁnancial institutions deal with fraud detection with a series
of if-then rules created by internal risk teams. If the result
of the rule is that a possible fraud is suspected, depending
on the rule, the transaction can be denied or an alert is
emitted for further investigation. The rules perform well as
long as there are no new fraud patterns, as repeated frauds
are required for the team to detect new patterns. There is,
therefore, a clear need for a better approach to the credit
card fraud detection problem.
The use of machine learning in fraud detection has been
an interesting topic in recent years. However, due to the
conﬁdentiality of ﬁnancial information and non availability
of public databases, few researches have had the opportunity
to work on developing methods speciﬁc to credit card fraud
detection [2]. Nevertheless, the literature on credit card
fraud detection is growing and it has been shown that
machine learning can be used successfully for this problem,
in particular: neural networks [3], artiﬁcial immune systems
[4], association rules [5], Bayesian learning [3], support
vector machines [6], and peer group analysis [7].
The databases used in developing credit card fraud detec-
tion systems have a very low ratio of fraudulent transactions,
ranging from 0.005% to 0.5%, see [4] and [6]. This generates
complications during the training of the different algorithms
[8]. Because of this, a common practice in the research
community is to carry out an under-sampling procedure [9],
consisting in creating a sample of the database with a higher
percentage of fraudulent cases.
Most of these studies compare they proposed algorithm
with a benchmark logistic regression, and all of them make
the comparison using a classical evaluation measure such as
misclassiﬁcation, precision and recall [2]. The particularity
of credit card fraud is that wrongly predicting a fraudulent
transaction as legitimate carries a signiﬁcantly different cost
than the inverse case. In [10], a method that differentiates
between these costs was proposed, but it assumes a constant
difference between them, which is a typical assumption is
cost sensitive classiﬁcation [11]. By contrast, we propose an
evaluation measure that realistically represents the monetary
gains and losses due to fraud and its detection. Moreover,
we present a Bayes minimum risk classiﬁer including the
real ﬁnancial costs of credit card fraud detection in order
to have a cost sensitive detection system. The proposed cost
sensitive method decreased signiﬁcantly the cost due to fraud
as compared with state of the art techniques.
Using a real transactional database with fraudulent and
legitimate transactions from a large European card pro-
cessing company, we compare standard algorithms, using
both classical measures and the proposed ﬁnancial measure.
Afterwards, because of the poor performance of the state of
the art techniques, a cost sensitive system is developed in
order to integrate the real ﬁnancial costs due to credit card
fraud. We ﬁrst use a thresholding optimization technique and
ﬁnally a Bayes minimum risk classiﬁer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present our proposed cost sensitive evalu-
ation measure. Afterwards, we explain the prior work in
Section III. In Section IV, we present the cost sensitive credit
card fraud detection using Bayes minimum risk. Section V
describes the data we use for experiments. Then the results
are presented in Section VI. Finally, the conclusions of the
paper are given in Section VII.
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Table I
CONFUSION MATRIX OF A BINARY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
True Class (yi)
Fraud Legitimate
Predicted Fraud TP FP
Class (p) Legitimate FN TN
Table II
COST MATRIX USING FIXED FN COSTS PROPOSED IN [10]
True Class (yi)
Fraud Legitimate
Predicted Fraud Ca Ca
Class (p) Legitimate 100 · Ca 0
Table III
COST MATRIX USING REAL FINANCIAL COSTS
True Class (yi)
Fraud Legitimate
Predicted Fraud Ca Ca
Class (pi) Legitimate Amti 0
II. COST SENSITIVE CREDIT CARD FRAUD DETECTION
EVALUATION MEASURE
Once a credit card fraud detection system is developed,
it is very important to be able to evaluate and compare it to
other state of the art fraud detection systems. In Table I, the
classical confusion matrix of a credit card fraud detection
system is shown. This matrix is typically used to evaluate
binary classiﬁcation algorithms. The following traditional
statistics are extracted from it:
• Misclassiﬁcation = 1− TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN
• Recall = TPTP+FN
• Precision = TPTP+FP
• F1-Score = 2 Precision·RecallPrecision+Recall ,
where TP and FN are the numbers of true positives and
false negatives, respectively. We deﬁne as positive the case
when a fraud is committed, and negative otherwise. These
statistics are typically used to evaluate credit card fraud
detection systems [2], [10]. However, they assume that FP
carries the same cost as FN , but as will be shown later this
is not the case in credit card fraud detection. Hand et al. [10]
proposed a cost matrix [11] which differentiates the costs of
FP and FN , as given in Table II, where in the case of
FP the associated cost is the administrative cost Ca related
to analysing the transaction and contacting the card holder.
This cost is the same assigned to a TP because, in this case,
the card holder will have to be contacted. However, in the
case of an FN in which a fraud is not detected, the cost is
deﬁned to be a hundred times Ca.
Nevertheless, in practice, losses due to a speciﬁc fraud
range from few to thousands of Euros, which means that
assuming constant cost due to an FN is unrealistic. In
order to address this limitation, we introduce a new cost
matrix in Table III. We deﬁned the cost of an FN to be
the amount Amti of the transaction i. This cost matrix is a
better representation of the actual costs, since when a fraud
is not detected, the losses of that particular fraud correspond
to the stolen amount.
We deﬁne below the cost measure using the cost matrix
with real ﬁnancial costs proposed in Table III:
C =
m∑
i=1
yi (piCa + (1− pi)Amti) + (1− yi)piCa. (1)
This measure evaluates the sum of the cost for m trans-
actions, where yi and pi are the real and predicted labels,
respectively. Moreover, this cost matrix is not only used for
evaluation but it is also used to develop a cost sensitive clas-
siﬁcation algorithm using Bayes minimum risk as described
in the following section.
III. BAYES MINIMUM RISK
We use Bayes minimum risk as a method for cost sensitive
credit card fraud detection. As deﬁned in [12], the Bayes
minimum risk classiﬁer is a decision model based on quanti-
fying tradeoffs between various decisions using probabilities
and the costs that accompany such decisions. In the case of
credit card fraud detection, there are two decisions, either
predict a transaction as fraud pf or as legitimate pl. The risk
associated with predicting a transaction as fraud is deﬁned
as
R(pf |x) = L(pf |yf )P (pf |x) + L(pf |yl)P (pl|x), (2)
and when the transaction is predicted as legitimate it is
R(pl|x) = L(pl|yl)P (pl|x) + L(pl|yf )P (pf |x), (3)
where yf and yl are the real labels for fraudulent and
legitimate transactions respectively. P (pl|x) is the estimated
probability of a transaction being legitimate given x, sim-
ilarly P (pf |x) is the probability of a transaction being
fraud given x. Finally L(a, b) is the loss function when a
transaction is predicted as a and the real label is b. Once
both risks are calculated, a transaction is classiﬁed as fraud if
R(pf |x) ≤ R(pl|x), meaning if the risk associated with that
decision is lower than the risk associated with classifying it
as legitimate.
Since in the credit card fraud detection case the losses are
equal to the cost, ﬁrst we use the cost matrix with ﬁxed cost
for FN as deﬁned in Table II. Then a transaction will be
classiﬁed as fraud if:
CaP (pf |x) + CaP (pl|x) ≤ 100 · CaP (pf |x), (4)
and as legitimate otherwise.
Lastly, we test while using the proposed cost matrix with
real ﬁnancial costs as in Table III. A transaction will be
classiﬁed as fraud if the following condition is true:
CaP (pf |x) + CaP (pl|x) ≤ AmtiP (pf |x), (5)
and as legitimate if false.
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Table IV
DATABASE ATTRIBUTES
Attribute name Description
Date Date and hour of the transaction
Account number Identiﬁcation number of the account
Card number Identiﬁcation number of the card
Transaction type Type of transaction (Internet, Card present, ATM)
Amount Amount of transaction in Euros
Merchant ID Identiﬁcation of the merchant
Merchant group Merchant group identiﬁcation provided by the
card processing company
Country Country where the transaction took place
Country 2 Country of residence of the card holder
Type of card Card brand (Visa debit, Visa Classic, Mastercard
Gold, ...)
Gender Gender of the card holder
Age Card holder age
Bank Issuer bank of the card
Fraud Whenever the transaction was or not fraud
IV. DATA
We use a database provided by a large European card
processing company. The database consists of fraudulent and
legitimate transactions made with credit and debit cards dur-
ing 2012. The total database contains 80,000,000 individual
transactions, each one with 27 attributes. From the original
attributes we manually select those that contain useful in-
formation with help from the card processing company risk
team. Table IV shows the selected attributes.
Using the initial attributes we derived additional 260
attributes using the methodology proposed in [6] and [13].
The idea behind the derived attributes consists in using a
transaction aggregation strategy in order to capture consumer
spending behavior in the recent past. The derivation of the
attributes consists in grouping the transactions made during
the last given number of hours, ﬁrst by card or account
number, then by transaction type, merchant group, country
or other, followed by calculating the number of transactions
or the total amount spent on those transactions. An example
of a derived attribute is: number of transactions made during
the last 6 hours on the internet by the same individual in the
same country.
The database also includes a fraud label indicating when-
ever a transaction is identiﬁed as fraud. This label was
created internally in the card processing company, either
because the internal risk team detected a fraud or because
a client reported a fraudulent transaction on his/her card
statement and after an internal investigation the fraud is con-
ﬁrmed. Small amounts that may have slipped the attention of
inattentive card holders notwithstanding, this database can be
regarded as being extremely accurate. In the database only
20,000 transactions were labelled as fraud, leading to a fraud
ratio of 0.025%.
For our experiments, we select a smaller subset of trans-
actions with a higher fraud ratio, corresponding to a speciﬁc
group of transactions. This database contains 750,000 trans-
actions and a fraud ratio of 0.467%. In this database, the
Table V
DESCRIPTION OF DATABASES: ONE TRAINING DATABASE AND
DIFFERENT UNDER-SAMPLED DATABASES VARYING IN PERCENTAGE OF
FRAUDS.
Database Transactions Frauds Fraud Ratio Fraud Amount
Total 750,000 3,500 0.467% 866,410
Train 625,000 2,900 0.464% 721,349
Test 125,000 600 0.480% 148,562
S1 290,000 2,900 1% 721,349
S5 58,000 2,900 5% 721,349
S10 29,000 2,900 10% 721,349
S20 17,500 2,900 20% 721,349
S50 5,800 2,900 50% 721,349
total ﬁnancial losses due to fraud are 866,410 Euros. We
select this database because it is the one where most frauds
are being made. Still, in order to capture consumer patterns,
we used the full database to calculate the derived attributes.
From this database we used the ﬁrst 10 months (January to
October 2012) for training and the last 2 months (November
and December 2012) for testing. The motivation behind this
approach is the need to train the system in the same way
it will be implemented, in which past months are used to
predict the current month [6], [13].
V. RESULTS
First we test algorithms that have previously been used to
solve the credit card fraud detection problem [14], namely,
logistic regression (LR), C4.5 and random forest (RF),
see [8]. The implementation of these algorithms in Scikit-
learn was used [15]. For LR, an 2 norm regularization
was selected. The C4.5 algorithm was trained using the
default parameters of the Scikit-learn package. For the RF
algorithm, the maximum number of estimators in each split
was set to 10 and the Gini criterion for measuring the quality
of a split was selected.
Because these algorithms suffer when the label distribu-
tion is skewed towards one of the classes [8], we make
an under-sampling of the legitimate transactions in order to
have a more balanced class distribution. The under-sampling
has proved to be a better approach on such problems, see [9].
We create 5 different databases S1, S5, S10, S20 and S50,
each one having a different percentage of frauds 1%, 5%,
10%, 20% and 50%, respectively. The motivation to create
the different databases is to evaluate how the algorithms
perform on different class distributions. Table V summarizes
the different databases. It is important to note that the under-
sampling procedure was only applied to the training dataset
since the test database must reﬂect the real fraud distribution.
In addition to the traditional aforementioned algorithms
we also evaluate a thresholding optimization to make the
classiﬁers cost sensitive, based on the method proposed in
[16]. The idea behind this approach is to adaptively modify
the probability threshold of an algorithm such that a certain
criterion is minimized; in our case the cost due to fraud.
By default the probability threshold of an algorithm is 50%,
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(a) F1-Score (b) Cost
Figure 1. Results using LR, C4.5 and RF algorithms on different under-sampled databases, with Ca = 2, 50 Euros. RF outperforms the other algorithms
measured by cost and by F1-Score. The best results in terms of cost are found when a higher percentage of frauds is used for training. Nevertheless,
the best model using as a reference the F1-Score is when an under-sampled database with a 5% fraud rate is used, leading to the conclusion that when
selecting the algorithms by traditional statistics results are different than when a realistic ﬁnancial measure is used.
meaning that when the probability of a positive event is
greater than 50% that example is classiﬁed as positive. This
default threshold is not necessarily the one that minimizes
the cost due to fraud. So we make an optimization in
the training dataset, in order to ﬁnd the threshold which
minimizes the cost measure. Then, this new threshold is
applied to the test dataset to obtain the results, and by
doing so, we make the algorithm cost sensitive by threshold
optimization.
Afterwards, we apply the Bayes minimum risk classiﬁer
proposed in Section III, using the cost matrix with ﬁxed
FN cost described in Table II and the cost matrix with real
ﬁnancial costs proposed in Table III.
Subsequently, we adjust the estimated probabilities since
when applying the under-sampling methodology the esti-
mated probabilities of fraud are overestimated. This may
lead to methods that rely on true probabilities to have
inconsistencies, which is the case of the Bayes minimum risk
classiﬁer [12]. The reason this happens, is because the prior
probability of fraud is artiﬁcially increased by the under-
sampling. In order to solve this we adjust the estimated
probabilities with respect to the difference of the fraud
distribution in the under-sampled and the training datasets.
For the different algorithms using the test dataset we
evaluate the statistics deﬁned in Section II. We also evaluate
the cost due to fraud as deﬁned in (1), assuming the
Ca parameter is equal to 2.50 Euros. Finally we test the
sensibility of the results with respect to the Ca parameter.
A. Traditional algorithms
We evaluate the LR, C4.5 and RF algorithms, on the
full database and on the different under-sampled databases.
Results are shown in Figure 1. It is clear that when applying
under-sampling the best results are found when there is a
balanced distribution of frauds and not frauds on the training
database. In all cases the tree based models outperform the
LR. Additionally, when comparing the results based on the
traditional comparison measures, the best models measured
by F1-Score are with the database S5 meaning when the
frauds are 5% of the training database. The model selected
with the traditional F1-Score performs poorly in terms of
cost. There are no signiﬁcant savings as compared to using
no model at all, which corresponds to a cost of 148,562
Euros, equal to the total amount lost due to fraud in the
test database. This is why, for the following experiments,
we select the models trained in the S50 database, where
there are savings in money of up to 76%, despite the low
F1-Score.
B. Thresholding optimization
We apply the threshold optimization technique to the
algorithms trained with the S50 database, since the best
results using the traditional algorithms and measured by
cost, are found on that database. As described before, this
methodology attempts to make a classiﬁer cost sensitive by
changing the probability threshold. Figure 2a presents the re-
sults of applying this technique to LR (LR-T), C4.5 (C4.5-T)
and RF (RF-T) on the test dataset. Interestingly, when
applying this methodology not all models are improved. The
LR-T actually performs the worst, but the RF-T performs
much better, and even though in both cases there is an
increase in the recall, meaning the number of frauds detected
by the algorithms, the precision decreases in both cases.
With the C4.5-T algorithm, there is no change in the results
when applying the threshold optimization. On the other
hand, when the threshold optimization procedure is applied
to RF the cost is reduced by 2,165 Euros while the F1-Score
remains the same.
C. Bayes minimum risk classiﬁer
We compare the previous algorithms when applying the
Bayes minimum risk classiﬁer. First we evaluate this algo-
rithm using the cost matrix with ﬁxed FN cost described
in Table II. As can be seen in Figure 2b, applying these
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(a) Results of applying threshold optimization. The application of this
methodology only improves the result of the RF.
(b) Results of applying Bayes minimum risk methodology using a cost
matrix with ﬁxed FN cost described in Table II. This methodology
performs worse than the other methods, and in no case better results are
found.
(c) Results of applying Bayes minimum risk methodology using the
proposed cost matrix with real ﬁnancial costs described in Table III. When
applying the proposed cost matrix instead of the ﬁxed one, only the LR
algorithm improves.
(d) Results of applying Bayes minimum risk with adjusted probabilities
using the proposed cost matrix with real ﬁnancial costs. By applying this
method the RF results are improved.
Figure 2. Results of applying Bayes minimum risk methodology using different cost matrices. Using a cost matrix with the real ﬁnancial costs due to
fraud gives the best results both in terms of cost and F1−Score. The best overall result is found when the methodology Bayes minimum risk with adjusted
probabilities using the proposed cost matrix with real ﬁnancial costs is applied to RF.
algorithms does not give better results. In fact in all cases
the model performs worse. The results clearly show that it
is unrealistic to assume a constant false negative cost of a
hundred times the administrative cost, which motivates the
application of Bayes minimum risk using the cost matrix
proposed in Table III. In Figure 2c, the results are shown.
This methodology when applied to LR (LR-MR) performs
very well, increasing savings by 13,685 Euros compared
with LR. But then it becomes interesting that the RF
algorithm, which has already been improved by using the
thresholding methodology, performs very badly with the
Bayes minimum risk. This may be because the probability
estimates were trained using the under-sampled databases, so
the algorithms overestimate the true probabilities of fraud.
D. Bayes minimum risk classiﬁer with adjusted probabilities
We adjust the estimated probabilities as described before.
The results of the Bayes minimum risk with adjusted proba-
bilities are shown in Figure 2d. Now it can be seen that the
RF-MR A algorithm performs very good, being the overall
best model in terms of cost. It is even more interesting that
this model saves 8,870 more Euros than the RF-T, but the
Recall is down by almost 25%, meaning that this model is
detecting the most relevant frauds, that is, fraud with high
amounts.
E. Sensibility of Ca
Finally, in order to check that the results were not biased
by the selection of the Ca parameter, we compare the results
of all the algorithms by varying the parameter from 1.00 to
5.00 Euros. In Table VI the cost of the algorithm when the
administrative cost is 1.00, 2.50 and 5.00 Euros are shown.
It can be seen that in all cases, the best results are found
using RF-MR A.
F. Summary of results
Traditional algorithms applied to detect credit card fraud
perform well only when an under-sampling methodology
is applied. When applying the thresholding optimization
methodology, the RF-T algorithm improves the result in
terms of cost without sacriﬁcing the F1-Score. However, in
the case of the LR-T, the new model performs very badly. It
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Table VI
COST RESULTS VARYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COST IN EUROS
Algorithm Ca=1,00 Ca=2,50 Ca=5,00
C4.5 35,466 57,726 86,215
LR 46,530 59,157 80,202
RF 33,641 47,669 61,969
C4.5-T 35,531 57,888 86,215
LR-T 56,704 87,127 94,977
RF-T 26,598 45,504 66,374
C4.5-MR H 35,531 57,888 79,879
LR-MR H 56,357 95,190 104,027
RF-MR H 37,964 67,977 90,092
C4.5-MR 35,120 56,176 83,117
LR-MR 28,320 45,472 62,570
RF-MR 32,380 58,165 71,694
C4.5-MR A 31,631 56,551 70,127
LR-MR A 27,212 48,915 69,185
RF-MR A 20,929 36,634 52,003
is expected that on the training dataset this methodology
performs at least as well as not using it, but seeing the
different results found on the test database with the different
algorithms leads to the conclusion that this method is
overﬁtting the training data.
More importantly, it turns out that real ﬁnancial costs need
to be used when applying Bayes minimum risk. Using a
cost matrix with ﬁxed FN cost as proposed in [10], gives
poor results. This is because in practice the cost of for
different FN varies signiﬁcantly. When using our proposed
cost matrix with the real ﬁnancial cost, very good results
are found in the case of LR-MR. In this case the cost is
reduced by 13,685 Euros. Furthermore, when adjusting the
estimated probabilities before applying Bayes minimum risk
to RF, the best results in terms of cost are found. In this case
the best overall model is found with a cost of 36,634 Euros,
meaning savings of 23% as compared to RF.
The above result is veriﬁed for different amounts of Ca,
that is, when varying Ca between 1.00 and 5.00 Euros. The
proposed RF-MR A is consistently the best method.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown the importance of using
the real ﬁnancial costs of credit card fraud when selecting
credit card fraud detection algorithms. Also, it is not enough
to have a ﬁxed difference between FP and FN but it is
important to have the real FN cost of each transaction.
Moreover, our evaluations conﬁrmed that including the real
cost by creating a cost sensitive system using a Bayes
minimum risk classiﬁer, gives rise to much better fraud
detection results in the sense of higher savings.
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